We study the properties of optimal monetary policy in an environment of nominal wage rigidity and unemployment. We show that nominal wage rigidity increases the sacri…ce ratio, and therefore reduces the e¤ectiveness of sacri…cing employment in order to stabilize in ‡ation. It follows that in response to higher nominal wage rigidity, it is optimal to allow for smaller ‡uctuations of unemployment at the expense of larger in ‡ation ‡uctuations.
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Introduction
One of the many contributions of micro-founded models is their usefulness in supporting welfare analysis. New Keynesian (NK) models are therefore widely employed to derive optimal monetary plans and to learn their properties. We employ the emerging approach of integrating labor market search and matching frictions into NK models, to explore the properties of the optimal monetary policy under discretion in an environment of unemployment and staggered nominal wages. Our main result refers to the optimal response of unemployment and in ‡ation deviations (from their natural rate and target, respectively) in response to business cycle shocks. More speci…cally, we explore the optimal ratio of such deviations, namely the optimal unemployment-in ‡ation ratio, and show why it falls with the degree of nominal wage rigidity.
Earlier studies of labor market ‡uctuations, based on the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides (DMP) 1 search and matching setup, generated labor market behavior which was not consistent with observed moments: compared with the results suggested by theoretically based models, observed wages seemed to be much more stable and unemployment much more volatile. This led Hall (2005a) and Shimer (2005) to suggest additions to the equilibrium mechanisms of the labor market, thus introducing real wage rigidities to the search and matching literature.
Similarly, the standard approach taken by the earlier NK literature analyzed environments characterized by a neo-classical labor market, without imperfections such as wage rigidity or unemployment. In such an environment, standard models showed that productivity shocks don't induce any output-in ‡ation tradeo¤ from the perspective of monetary policy-a result which Blanchard and Galí (2007) referred to as a divine coincidence. Erceg et al. (2000) were the …rst to show that staggered wage contracts break this divine coincidence, and were followed by later NK models which introduced such nominal wage rigidity.
However, the …rst such models were still characterized by an otherwise neo-classical labor market, with endogenous adjustments on the intensive margins, but not on the extensive ones. That is, even when staggered nominal wages were assumed, the standard setup in-1 See Mortensen (2011) for a review of the DMP framework and its evolution.
cluded endogenous working hours but full employment, similar to the original setup of Erceg et al. (2000) . 2 Recently, the DMP search and matching setup has been integrated into the NK model, enriching the structure by introducing extensive margins which in ‡uence the model's dynamics, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Galí (2010) describes some of the essential ingredients and properties of those models and their implications. Labor market frictions can contribute by improving the …t of otherwise standard NK models. But the literature's attention is also focused on theoretical analysis of optimal monetary policy under such labor market imperfections. Faia (2008) and Blanchard and Galí (2010) Thomas (2008) and Blanchard and Galí (2010) . 3 Galí (2010) enhances the argument made by Hall (2005a) , that the most important contribution of labor market frictions lies in making room for wage rigidity which, in turn, has important consequences for business cycles dynamics, with implications for monetary policy.
In the present work we extend the model recently proposed by Blanchard and Galí (2010) , hereinafter BG. In their work, BG introduce labor market frictions into an NK model in a very simple manner. Indeed, they emphasize that simpli…cation is one of the
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major contributions of their paper. They use a basic NK model into which they integrate real wage rigidity, as well as hiring cost that increases with the ratio of hires to the unemployment pool. 4 Among its other merits, this simpli…cation enables the implementation of the quadratic approximation of the household utility function, following the popular approach pioneered by Rotemberg and Woodford (1998) .
Our extension of the BG model includes rigidity of nominal wages and an explicit solution to the optimal unemployment-in ‡ation ratio under discretion. Thomas (2008) already presents a normative analysis of this kind, explaining that under rigidity of real wages (which is the case under the BG speci…cation), the central bank loses most of its leverage over real wages. Along these lines, Galí (2010) also presents a similar extension and analysis. What we essentially add is an explicit solution with a comparative static with respect to some of the labor market frictions. We show that nominal wage rigidity reduces this optimal unemployment-in ‡ation ratio. This seems to be the case since nominal wage rigidity increases the sacri…ce ratio, that is the employment that has to be sacri…ced in order to stabilize in ‡ation. It follows that with higher nominal wage rigidity, the optimal unemployment-in ‡ation ratio falls, and it is optimal to allow for smaller ‡uctuations of unemployment at the expense of larger in ‡ation ‡uctuations.
In addition, we deviate from BG not only by introducing nominal wage rigidity (instead of real rigidity) but we also further endogenize the wage as an equilibrium mechanism, as in Thomas (2008) and Galí (2010) . That is, while optimizing, economic agents account for the nominal rigidity and therefore make a forward looking decision, which leads to an equilibrium real wage which is both backward and forward looking. This dynamic nature of the perfectly endogenous real wage introduces an overshooting into the impulse response of the in ‡ation and other variables. As a result, impulse responses under discretionary monetary policy involve an overshooting pattern of in ‡ation which, in a standard and simple NK model, characterizes only the impulse response under commitment, but not under discretion (Galí, 2008, Ch.5, among others) . Through the expectations channel, this overshooting can be very useful in stabilizing the economy following exogenous shocks. As a result, nominal wage rigidity not only a¤ects the optimal unemployment-in ‡ation ratioby reducing it as discussed above-but it may also help to reduce the amplitudes of both unemployment and in ‡ation, as a response to a given level of exogenous shock.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model which is then calibrated in Section 3. The mechanisms at work are discussed using impulse response analysis in Section 4. The e¤ects of nominal wage rigidity on optimal monetary policy under discretion are explored in Section 5, which is followed by concluding remarks in Section 6.
The model
This section presents the formal setup of an NK model with two labor market imperfections:
search and matching frictions and nominal wage rigidity. It then presents and discusses an analytical solution for the optimal policy under discretion.
The structure

Preferences and technology
The economy consists of large, in…nitely lived households, with full risk sharing within each one of them. The representative household maximizes an in…nite horizon utility function:
where E t denotes expectations formed at period t; is the time discount factor, N t 2 [0; 1] is the fraction of representative household members who are employed at period t and C t is a standard Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) sub-utility function of …nal goods with constant elasticity of substitution (CES), ":
Households thus have two decisions to make: labor supply, which is discussed below, and a standard consumption-saving decision,
where P t is a standard Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) consumer price index and i t is the nominal interest rate set by the central bank.
Intermediate goods are produced competitively, using a constant returns to scale technology, with an exogenous productivity shock A t which is common across …rms. Thus, the production technology of the single and competitive intermediate good is
where N t (j) is the employment in …rm j 2 [0; 1] : Assuming big enough families, employment within each family is distributed the same as in the economy, so that
Finally, di¤erentiated …nal goods are produced by a continuum of …rms which simply brand name and di¤erentiate intermediate goods, so that
The labor market
Employment in …rm j evolves as:
where 2 (0; 1) is an exogenous separation rate and the variable H t (j) denotes new hiring by …rm j; from the pool of those unemployed at the beginning of the period. 6 Aggregating based on (2.4), we get
where
5 We adopt the BG separation of intermediate and …nal goods …rms, so as to avoid interaction between price setting and wage bargaining at the …rm level.
6 Hall (2005b) , Shimer (2005) and Shimer (2007) report some …ndings supporting the simplifying assumption of exogenous and constant separation rate, according to which unemployment ‡uctuates mostly due to variations in hiring.
We assume full participation, from which it follows that end-of-period unemployment is: 2.8) and unemployment at the beginning of the period is:
Labor market tightness is de…ned as: This hiring cost is expressed in terms of the CES bundle of goods. We therefore obtain the following market clearing condition:
Flexible wage benchmark
We begin this subsection assuming both wage and price ‡exibility. We close it by explaining why the following results are satis…ed as long as wages are ‡exible, in the case of price rigidity as well. Under ‡exible prices, optimal price setting by retailers yields the standard markup over their marginal cost:
(2.14)
where the optimal markup is M = "= (" 1) : Under rigid prices, however, the actual markup ‡uctuates and therefore deviates from the optimal one, M:
We use the Nash bargaining solution to characterize the real wage in equilibrium. By de…nition, the labor market tightness, x t ; is also the job …nding rate. Hence, letting W F lex t denote the ‡exible real wage, which is therefore symmetric across the economy, the value of an employed member to the household is:
; (2.15)
where, V U t ; the value of an unemployed member is:
The Nash bargaining solution under ‡exible wages is the wage level that solves
where the parameter denotes the bargaining power of the households, the surplus from employment is (2.18) and the …rm surplus from an established employment relationship is simply the hiring cost saved at the margins,
With # 1 denoting the relative bargaining power of the households, the solution to the Nash bargaining problem (2.17) is S H t = #S F t : Using (2.18) and (2.19), the real wage that satis…es this solution under the ‡exible wages benchmark is
Recall that at this point we assume both wage and price ‡exibility. Also note that under ‡exible wages we can substitute
Substituting the pricing condition of the …nal good …rm (2.14) into the one of the intermediate good …rm (2.13), we can solve for the wage level which is consistent with the pricing decision. From (2.20) we get the wage level consistent with Nash bargaining. Comparing the two, and substituting the market clearing condition (2.12) to eliminate the consumption levels, we get an expression which does not include the productivity level, A t : Using (2.7, 2.9 and 2.10) as well, we can solve for all the labor market pools and ‡ows, which are therefore constant under ‡exible prices and wages.
This is a result of the speci…c BG preferences structure, in which income and substitution e¤ects on labor supply cancel each other out. Under this speci…cation, productivity shocks are fully absorbed by real wages and quantities of goods-output, consumption and hiring costs-while labor market pools and ‡ows remain constant. More generally, this result re ‡ects what Blanchard and Galí (2007) called the divine coincidence: that under ‡exible wages there is an equivalence between the e¢ cient and the natural employment (or output in their paper), where the second is de…ned as the one consistent with price stability.
Let x denote the constant labor market tightness under the benchmark of ‡exible wages and prices. It follows from the marginal cost and optimal pricing (2.13 and 2.14), that the real wage under this benchmark is:
Now, substituting (2.11), (2.12) and (2.21) into (2.13), we get
This means that, even without assuming ‡exible prices, as long as the wage level satis…es (2.21), the real marginal cost can be expressed in terms of labor market pools alone (without any direct e¤ect of the productivity shock). That is, as long as the wage level is ‡exibly set according to (2.21), there is no tradeo¤ between in ‡ation and labor market pools. It follows that, as long as wages are set ‡exibly, a welfare maximizing central bank would continuously keep in ‡ation at zero, which is enough for the above results to be satis…ed:
under ‡exible wages, the wage level would evolve according to (2.21), so that productivity shocks would drive wages and quantities of goods (consumption, output and hiring costs), leaving labor market pools unchanged. 
Equilibrium with nominal wage rigidities
Here, while introducing nominal wage rigidity, we depart from the BG speci…cation. We use the Calvo (1983) setup, assuming that every period a randomly selected portion of the existing wage contracts, w 2 (0; 1) ; are not renegotiated, 10 whereas new contracts are assigned to the average wage. 11 Arguably, it might be more empirically appealing to impose wage update constraints on the …rm level, rather than on the contract level. For instance, Thomas (2008) uses the Calvo (1983) formalization, assuming that randomly selected …rms renegotiate wage contracts, so that-within each …rm-newly hired workers receive the same wage as continuing workers. While Thomas (2008) also justi…es his choice 9 Appendix A shows another BG result: if M = 1 and # = ; the ‡exible wage equilibrium renders the optimal allocation. The …rst condition, M = 1; can be satis…ed with an employment subsidy in place, that would completely o¤set the monopolistic distortion. The externalities relevant to the second condition, # = ; are familiar from Hosios (1990) . 10 We assume that this random selection is realized only after separations take place. Thus, whether wages are renegotiated or not is not a consideration that a¤ects (the exogenous) separations. Also note that, due to the Calvo-style wage rigidity, there is wage dispersion. However, with complete risk sharing within each one of the big households, such wage dispersion does not cause consumption dispersion and we are therefore left with a standard, representative household investment-saving decision.
11 Galí (2010) reviews some of the literature and arguments concerning alternative wage setting schemes for new hires. He suggests that the empirical evidence on its relevance seems controversial. based on empirical …ndings from the literature, our modeling choice is a simplifying one: even though we use linear technology, our wage scheme enables treating all intermediategoods producers symmetrically, assuming they share the same marginal wage, W m t ; and therefore the same marginal cost (2.13).
12 Applying the law of large numbers, we get the law of motion for the average nominal wage:
where small letter denotes the nominal wage. Thus, the variable w t denotes the weighted average of nominal wage in the economy as a whole and the variable w t denotes the equilibrium nominal wage of the subset of wages renegotiated at period t. Whenever renegotiated, the nominal wage schedule based on Nash bargaining ends up satisfying the following condition:
That is, whenever …rms and workers renegotiate wages, they account for the expected path of productivity and price levels. Thus, the negotiated wage ends up being a weighted average of future expected Nash bargaining results under the ‡exible wages benchmark.
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The weights consist of the relevant time-discount factor, i , the job survival probability,
(1 ) i , and the survival probability of the negotiated wage, (
Combining equations 2.22 and 2.23, together with the de…nition of the aggregate real wage, W t w t =P t ; we get a dynamic expression for the aggregate real wage, W t (step by step derivation is provided in appendix B below):
12 Alternatively, Galí (2010) assumes decreasing returns to scale, which enables equating marginal costs across …rms even when they face heterogenous marginal wages. The speci…cation of Galí (2010) , however, complicates the welfare based criterion of the central bank, by making it also a function of wage in ‡ation. 13 For this Nash bargaining result to hold, it should be veri…ed that both households and …rms have non-negative surplus under the new real wage, so that neither of them has an incentive to terminate the employment relationship (see Hall (2005a) and Galí (2010) ). Therefore, the following condition should hold: C t N t W t A t =M: Like BG, we assume that the economy ‡uctuates due to productivity shocks that are small enough for this condition to hold.
Here the backward looking coe¢ cient is bw w = (where we de…ne
the forward looking coe¢ cient is f w w (1 ) = ; and the elasticity with respect to the ‡exible wage benchmark is f lex (1
That is, the real wage is a function of the contemporaneous productivity shock, but due to nominal frictions it is also a function of past and future-expected real wage and in ‡ation.
Log linearization, Phillips curve and Fischer equation
Before solving for the optimal policy rule, we log-linearize the model around its purely deterministic steady state. Appendix C presents the log-linearized system of equations, where hat over a variable denotes logarithmic deviation from the purely deterministic steady state.
14 In addition to the policy rule, which is treated in the next subsection, the loglinearized system includes two equations not described in the preceding text. The …rst one is a standard NK Phillips curve (NKPC) for in ‡ation (b t ln (P t+1 =P t )),
where p is the degree of goods price rigidity, de…ned in an analogous way to its nominal wage counterpart w (see Woodford (2003) or Galí (2008) , among others, for a step by step derivation). The second is the Fischer equation, connecting real and nominal interest rates (b r t and b i t ; respectively):
All together, the log-linearized system includes nine equations and the following nine variables:
A welfare based policy
We close the model using an optimal policy rule. The central bank sets its policy instrument, the nominal interest rate, so as to minimize the following utility based loss function:
where u "
(1 + ) (1 u) 1 > 0; the parameter u denotes the constant unemployment rate under ‡exible wages and b u t u t u is the deviations from this rate, expressed in terms of percentage points (pp). Under slightly di¤erent assumptions, as in Thomas (2008) and Galí (2010) , the welfare based criterion of the central bank would also be a function of wage in ‡ation. 16 Note that, while the degree of price rigidity enters the loss function, 17 the degree of wage rigidity does not. Yet, the degree of wage rigidity will end up a¤ecting the optimal policy. Derivation of the loss function (2.26) as a quadratic approximation of the household utility function (2.1) is provided by appendix D. In a setup which includes nominal wage rigidity, Erceg et al. (2000) showed that nominal wage in ‡ation is also welfare reducing. However, simplifying assumptions adopted by the present work yielded a loss function (2.26) without this feature: since we use the same structural equations for preferences and technology as do BG, and considering our particular assumptions concerning the wage structure, the loss function (2.26) ends up being identical to theirs.
As discussed in Section 2.2, under ‡exible wages productivity shocks do not induce an unemployment-in ‡ation tradeo¤ and, therefore, both variables are stable at their optimal rates. Nominal wage rigidity is therefore welfare reducing: it induces a tradeo¤, and therefore ‡uctuations, of unemployment and in ‡ation as a response to productivity shocks.
18
15 Like BG, we simplify by assuming that a constant employment subsidy is in place, so as to o¤set the monopolistic distortion, and that the Hosios (1990)-like condition, # = ; is satis…ed. These assumptions are justi…ed by the results in appendix A: they assure that deviations from the steady-state allocation are indeed deviations from the optimal one.
16 Which is not the case in our setup, thanks to the linear technology we assume. This linearity, in turn, requires the particular assumptions we make with regard to the wage setting scheme (see footnote 12). 17 u contains ; which consists of the the goods price rigidity, p : 18 Although household utility (2.1) is not a direct function of in ‡ation, its quadratic approximation (2.26) is. The welfare-reducing e¤ect of in ‡ation ‡uctuations has the standard NK explanation, and is related to its distorting e¤ect on allocation: due to the interaction of staggered pricing and …nite elasticity of substitution Now, using some straightforward substitutions of the log-linearized system presented in appendix C, and ignoring all terms irrelevant for discretion (past, future-expected and exogenous values) the Lagrangian under discretion takes the following form:
where is a Lagrange multiplier and
is a positive value under our calibration. Roughly speaking, the Lagrangian (2.27) implies that the reduced-form parameter can be intuitively interpreted as being inversely related to the sacri…ce ratio.
It then follows that discretionary monetary policy aimed at minimizing the loss function (2.26) leads to the following policy rule:
The central bank sets the interest rate i t so as to satisfy the optimality condition (2.28).
It is straightforward from the optimal rule (2.28) that the optimal unemployment-in ‡ation ratio falls with the sacri…ce ratio (which is inversely related to ) and with the degree of aversion to unemployment ‡uctuations. A comparative static concerning this condition is discussed in Section 5 below.
Calibration
We consider every period to be a quarter. Accordingly, we calibrate the model based on quarterly series for the period 1998:Q1-2011:Q3. 19 The parameters are calibrated based on across …nal goods (and therefore across di¤erentiated types of labor e¤orts), in ‡ation increases the aggregate labor e¤ort required to achieve a given utility from consumption. The presence of the unemployment rate in the quadratic approximation (2.26) is more straightforward: households utility (2.1) is a function of labor e¤ort, which is related to the unemployment rate by a structural identity (2.8). Since the optimal allocation involves constant employment (as implied by the discussion in Section 2.2), deviations from this constant are welfare reducing. 19 Starting from the …rst quarter of 1998, there is available data about separations and hiring in the business sector, based on a review by the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Labor.
either …rst moments observed in the data or robust results from the literature. We use BG calibration as our baseline. Table 3 .1 presents the calibrated values of the parameters. Preference parameters are calibrated using common practice: = 0:99; = 1 and
Based on …rst moments observed in the data, we calibrate u = 8:4% and = 9:0%:
Note that while u is expressed in terms of percents of the labor force, is expressed in terms of percents of the working population. With some straightforward algebra we get the following steady state linkage:
which implies the calibration x = 0:5:
Based on estimation results by Argov et al. (2012) , we calibrate the price rigidity parameter to be p = 0:60: The wage rigidity parameter is calibrated to be w = 0:75; a value that re ‡ects a wage update frequency of once a year on average.
20;21
We are left with the parameters and B to be calibrated. Following BG, we parameterize = 1, and we calibrate B so that the steady-state hiring cost would be lower than 20 Galí (2010) reviews papers that …nd evidence for similar, and even stronger, nominal wage rigidity based on micro data and surveys from U.S. and European economies. 21 Note that BG choose to calibrate = 0:75: This implies a price update frequency of once a year on average, in line with our assumption regarding the degree of nominal wage rigidity. We choose = 0:60; assuming that the price of goods are less sticky than nominal wages. Since under the ‡exible wage benchmark productivity shock does not induce any tradeo¤ between in ‡ation and unemployment, they both remain constant under this benchmark. Under nominal wage rigidity this is no longer the case, and productivity shock does induce an in ‡ation-unemployment tradeo¤. The on-impact response to a productivity shock under nominal wage rigidity is that the real wage ends up being lower than its ‡exible-benchmark counterpart. Hence, labor e¤ort increases on impact due to higher demand, but also due to a higher supply of labor.
1% of GDP. This implies
Considering the lower wage, increased labor demand is straightforward. The on-impact increase in labor supply is driven by income e¤ect and by continuation value, which dominate a negative substitution e¤ect. While the substitution e¤ect is subject only to an intra-temporal consideration, the …rst two are forward looking: permanent income falls due to lower present and future wages, and continuation value increases since the future labor market is less tight and future wages are higher (compared with the ‡exible benchmark). Such continuation-value consideration is unique to a labor market with frictions on the external margins, and is absent in a neo-classical labor market which characterizes the simple NK model. On impact we thus end up with higher labor e¤ort relative to the ‡exible wage benchmark, and therefore with lower unemployment. The increased labor e¤ort is re ‡ected by a positive output gap, that is, a gap between the rigid-wage output and the ‡exible-wage output.
At the same time there is also a negative in ‡ation on impact: the real wage, being lower than its ‡exible wage counterpart, drives real marginal cost down. 22 It is impossible to increase in ‡ation without further reducing unemployment. Hence, the in ‡ation-unemployment tradeo¤ under nominal wage rigidity is re ‡ected by this impulse response to productivity shock, with both unemployment and in ‡ation deviating from their steady-state rates. Figure 4 .1 shows that the convergence under nominal wage rigidity is characterized by the overshooting of some variables. This is so since the wage rigidity, the same rigidity that on impact attenuates the wage increase, also delays the convergence back to the steady-state wage. That is, while on impact the rigidity causes a wage which is lower than the benchmark, down the road the same rigidity causes a wage which is higher than the benchmark. Thus, it is the dynamic nature of the wage that is responsible for the overshooting of in ‡ation and other variables. In turn, the dynamic nature of the wage results from the rigidity being speci…ed as part of the structure, that is, the rigidity is accounted for during optimization and bargaining by the economic agents. This is one of the added values from extending the BG speci…cation. With regard to in ‡ation, such overshoot implies a path that under the basic NK model is typical to monetary policy under commitment, not to discretionary policy which characterizes the present analysis. With in ‡ation being forward looking, which is the case under our standard NKPC (2.25), the overshooting is helpful in stabilizing in ‡ation and, by extension, the economy as a whole.
It means that nominal wage rigidity, in addition to its e¤ect on the optimal unemploymentin ‡ation ratio, is also helpful in reducing the volatility of the entire system in response to a given shock.
To shed some more light on the economic mechanisms at work, appendix E depicts the response to a cost-push shock.
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Optimal monetary policy
Provided that productivity shocks induce an unemployment-in ‡ation tradeo¤ under price and wage rigidity, we saw that an optimal, discretionary monetary policy (2.28) should accommodate such shocks by allowing ‡uctuations of both unemployment and in ‡ation. The plot on the right side of Figure 5 .1 presents the optimal b u t =b t ratio as a function of price and wage rigiditiesp and w ; respectively. Since these parameters denote the probability that an update signal is not received, as they grow from zero to one nominal prices and wages become more rigid. Hence, the right side of the …gure shows that the optimal b u t =b t ratio falls with nominal rigidity. That is, when nominal rigidity increases, it is optimal to have smaller deviations of unemployment (from its natural rate) at the expense of in ‡ation deviations. Here, both wage and price rigidity increase the sacri…ce ratio, which is inversely related to the reduced-form parameter in the Lagrangian (2.27), : The associated economic mechanism is simple -when nominal rigidity increases, wages are less responsive to activity and, therefore, so are marginal costs which drive in ‡ation. Thus, as nominal rigidity increases, it is less e¤ective to sacri…ce unemployment for stabilizing in ‡ation. This e¤ect dominates another one which works in the opposite direction: higher goods-price rigidity increases the importance of in ‡ation stabilization.
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The left side of Figure 5 .1 presents the optimal b u t =b t ratio with respect to two other structural parameters: the separation rate and the hiring cost elasticity with respect to labor market tightness-and ; respectively. These two parameters are related to real labor market frictions. The …gure shows that the optimal b u t =b t ratio falls with separation but increases with the hiring cost elasticity. To understand the in ‡uence of these parameters on the optimal ratio, it is useful to consider their sacri…ce ratio e¤ect. Higher separation rate, ; reduces the continuation value of established employment relationships, thus making the actual real wage more responsive to the contemporaneous ‡exible one. 25 Hence, higher separation means a higher sacri…ce ratio, which leads to a lower optimal b u t =b t ratio. The hiring cost elasticity, ; works in the other direction-it increases marginal cost elasticity, 24 Being (negatively) related to ; price rigidity p directly enters the welfare criterion (2.26) through u ; thus increasing the importance of in ‡ation stabilization. This is a standard NK result, re ‡ecting the idea that the distorting e¤ect of in ‡ation grows with nominal rigidity and therefore motivates a higher, not lower b u t =b t ratio. In the standard NK model, as in Woodford (2003) for instance, the two forcesnamely, the sacri…ce ratio e¤ect and the direct e¤ect on the welfare criterion-cancel each other out and the optimal ratio between in ‡ation and the so called output gap under discretion is invariant to the degree of price rigidity. Here, however, with the existence of both price and wage rigidity, the sacri…ce ratio e¤ect dominates the direct e¤ect on the welfare criterion, so that the optimal b u t =b t ratio falls with nominal rigidity.
25 This is evident, most clearly, by the result of Nash bargaining under rigid wages (2.23).
hence in ‡ation elasticity, with respect to labor market tightness. It follows that the sacri…ce ratio falls with (indeed, it is easy to verify that @ =@ > 0), which therefore increases the optimal b u t =b t ratio.
Concluding remarks
We present a simple new Keynesian model with two labor market imperfections-search and matching frictions and nominal wage rigidity. In such case, it is no longer possible to achieve what Blanchard and Galí (2007) referred to as a divine coincidence: constant employment and zero in ‡ation when the economy is subject to productivity shocks, which is shown to be the optimal equilibrium result under ‡exible wages. We then discuss how monetary policy under discretion is in ‡uenced by these labor market imperfections. That is, we discuss how the optimal ratio between deviations of unemployment and in ‡ation-from their natural rate and target, respectively-changes with the intensity of these imperfections.
Similar to the conclusions of Thomas (2008) and Blanchard and Galí (2010) , we show that labor market frictions imply that optimal monetary policy should accommodate some in ‡ation and limit the degree of unemployment ‡uctuations. We show that labor market imperfections a¤ect the sacri…ce ratio, which in turn a¤ects the optimal ratio between unemployment and in ‡ation deviations. Imperfections that reduce the slope of the Phillips curve, thus increasing the sacri…ce ratio, reduce the optimal unemployment-in ‡ation ratio and vice versa. The idea is that using unemployment to stabilize in ‡ation is less e¢ cient when the sacri…ce ratio increases.
We further show that while some labor market imperfections increase the sacri…ce ratio, and therefore reduce the optimal unemployment-in ‡ation ratio, other imperfections may have the opposite e¤ect. Two of the imperfections we discuss, namely nominal wage rigidity and the separation rate, increase the sacri…ce ratio, therefore reducing the optimal ratio between unemployment and in ‡ation deviations. At the same time, a third imperfection has the opposite e¤ect-hiring cost elasticity with respect to labor market tightness.
While this work examines a monetary policy under discretion, it would be interesting to explore the mechanisms at work under commitment. The interaction between policy and the various expectation channels of the economy is richer under commitment, compared with the case of discretion. Nominal wage rigidity further enriches these channels by contributing both backward-and forward-looking channels. For instance, analyzing the impulse response to productivity shock under discretionary monetary policy (Section 4), we saw that wage rigidity causes in ‡ation to have an overshooting response which, under the basic NK model, is only typical of monetary policy under commitment. Through the expectations channel, such overshooting can be very useful in stabilizing the economy, by reducing the amplitudes of both unemployment and in ‡ation as a response to a given level of exogenous shock. It is therefore a natural next step to explore the interactions between nominal wage rigidity and monetary policy under commitment.
Appendices Appendix A Optimal allocation
In this appendix we derive an implicit solution to the optimal labor market tightness, x:
The result will be useful to compare the ‡exible wage to the optimal equilibria, as well as while deriving the quadratic loss function (2.26) in appendix D below.
The optimality condition denoted by the planner's problem is:
Substituting the resource constraint (2.12) in, we get:
Note that the exogenous productivity shock is cancelled out in the last expression, which includes only labor market pools. This is consistent with Subsection 2.2, from which we know that under ‡exible wages there is no unemployment-in ‡ation tradeo¤ and that, as a 26 Interpretations are discussed by BG.
result, labor market pools and ‡ows end up being constant. Therefore, the last condition can be further simpli…ed to:
where we also used (2.7) and drop the time subindex t to denote constant levels.
We can compare the optimal allocation to the market solution under ‡exible wages.
The optimal allocation is re ‡ected by either one of the last two expressions. The second, the market solution achieved under ‡exible wages, is re ‡ected by the solution to the Nash bargaining problem under ‡exible wages, with (2.21) substituted into (2.20). It is easy to verify that the two solutions are equivalent if M = 1 and # = :
Now using (2.7) and (2.9), we get:
which we also used in the calibration (Section 3). Substituting into (A.1), we get an implicit expression for the optimal labor market tightness, x:
Appendix B The real wage
Rearranging the nominal wage consistent with Nash bargaining (2.23) we get:
From which it follows that:
Now rearranging the aggregate nominal wage (2.22), we can express it as a weighted average between past and present aggregate nominal wages:
Comparing the last two equations and rearranging, we get the nominal wage as a function of past and future-expected nominal wages, and of present productivity and price levels:
We then divide through by the price level, P t , and use the de…nition linking real and nominal wages, W t w t =P t ; to get the expression for the real wage (2.24).
Appendix C Log linearization
Log linearizing the labor market tightness (2.10) we obtain:
where we used (2.9).
Log linearizing the clearing condition in the goods market (2.12) and substituting a log linearized version of the expression for hiring (2.7), we get:
where g Bx a :
The marginal cost (2.13) is expressed, in log linearized terms, as follows:
where the steady-state real wage is w = A (as in the period-by-period Nash bargaining result), and the real wage (2.24) after log linearization is:
The New Keynesian Phillips curve (2.25) is:
The intertemporal Euler condition (2.2) is:
where the real interest rate is de…ned as:
De…ning b u t u t u allows us to use the following connection between employment to end-of-period unemployment:
Finally, the optimal policy rule (2.28) is
We thus end up with a log linearized system of nine equations (C.1-C.9) to describe the law of motion of the nine variables, n b
Appendix D Utility based loss function
This appendix derives the quadratic approximation (2.26) to the household utility loss function. The derivation is essentially identical to the one in Blanchard and Galí (2010) , and is brought here for the work to be self-contained, but also to show that the di¤erent setup of the wage rigidity does not a¤ect the approximation. Throughout the derivation, we assume that the decentralized equilibrium yields the optimal one. That is, we assume that an employment subsidy is in place to fully o¤set the monopolistic distortion, so that M = 1; and that a Hosios (1990)-like condition is satis…ed, so that # = :
D.1 Derivation
A second order approximation of the household utility function (2.1) yields:
where o (jj jj 3 ) represents terms of third or higher order.
De…ne small letters with hat as logarithmic deviations from steady state, so that b z t ln (Z t =Z) : It follows that 27 :
Now expressing (D.1) in terms of logarithmic deviations from a purely deterministic steady state, using the approximation (D.2), we get:
where t:i:p: stands for Terms Independent of (monetary) Policy. The last expression can be simpli…ed to:
Next we have to …nd a quadratic approximation for the relation between b c t and b n t :
Market clearing condition (2.12), together with the standard demand under a Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) setup, implies: 27 From the de…nition b z t ln (Z t =Z) we get that Ze
It then follows, using a second order Taylor expansion, that
where j 2 [0; 1] is a good index and we use the de…nition D t
Lemma 1 Assuming that Bx is small enough so that terms involving Bx b n t are of second order, we can show that:
The proof is in Subsection D.2 below.
Using the Lemma and (D.4), we get:
where 0 1 Bx a (1+ ) 1 Bx and 1
Logarithmic transformation yields:
Lemma 2 Up to a second order approximation,
Using (D.6) and Lemma 2, we can rewrite (D.3) as:
But from the optimal allocation (A.1) we get that 0 + 1 N 1+ = 0; so we get: 28 To use this approximation for ln(1 + b z t ); take 1 + b z t to be the entire expression inside the ln from the right hand side of (D.5). We also have to use b z = ln (Z=Z) = 0 and the assumption employed by Lemma 1, suggesting that terms involving Bx b n t are of second order.
D.2 Proofs of Lemmas
Proof of Lemma 1. First note that, based on the steady-state representation of (2.7)
we get that H = N: Now a second order approximation of the expression N t Bx t H t from the left hand side of (D.4) yields:
where, similarly to Blanchard and Galí (2010) , we assume that Bx is small enough so that the terms involving Bx b n t are of second order (which means that terms involving Bx b n 2 t are of higher order and therefore dropped). Now based on (2.7) we get : Substituting in, we get:
Substituting in the linear approximation (C.1) as well, we get:
Now using the approximation (D.2) and the above-mentioned assumption about the term Bx b n t ; we can rewrite as:
Collecting terms and rearranging we get the expression in Lemma 1.
Proof of Lemma 2. Optimal allocation across di¤erentiated goods under a Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) setup yields a price index that satis…es:
where the last expression is a second order approximation. Solving for p t it follows that:
It therefore follows that
where the third row is a second order approximation and the fourth one follows from a substitution of (D.7). Therefore, up to a second order approximation, we see that d t '
" 2 var j [p t (j)] ; which proves Lemma 2.
Proof of Lemma 3. Combining the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) style demand and Calvo (1983) style rigid prices gives the following linearized expression for the average price: Shock to the NKPC (C.5). The shock is an AR(1) process, with the degree of persistence being equal to 0.5. Red dashed line -a ‡exible wage benchmark. Blue solid line -dynamics under nominal wage frictions.
